MINDING THE GAPS—IDENTIFYING AND FILLING HOLES IN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY PROTECTIVE SECURITY
The APPEA Journal
46(1) 651 - 662
Published: 2006
Abstract
The Federal Government, mindful of the pivotal importance of reliable supplies of oil and gas for the economic stability of the nation, has recently passed the Maritime Transport Security Amendment Act 2005. This introduces a security plan for Australia’s offshore oil and gas facilities aimed at combating the likelihood of physical attack by terrorists or other organisations.Here we discuss that security plan, and identify potential gaps of especial significance for the petroleum industry. Our focus is on the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities represented by presently available technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) plus commercial and allied-government satellites. In this discussion we dispel various myths (for example, the fiction of continuously-available real-time imagery).
Next we consider the near-term future (next five-to-ten years) and analyse the improved ISR capabilities that will result from the burgeoning technologies being introduced during that period. These include the next generation of UAVs (including high-altitude long-endurance platforms) and also continuous (but limited resolution) imagery of the whole globe obtained from geostationary orbit. Again we identify potential security gaps that are pertinent from the perspective of the petroleum industry.
On the basis of our capability gap identification we make recommendations with regard to evolving security concerns that the petroleum industry may wish to consider for submission to the Federal Government: given what ISR science, technology and engineering can deliver, what could be done on a whole-of-nation basis to optimise the defence of our offshore facilities?
Finally, we outline the modelling and simulation capabilities that are available specifically to aid such organisations as the Department of Defence and Coastwatch in efforts to anticipate and thus efficiently and effectively ameliorate the potential for such attacks. These may well be of interest to the industry in that they underpin the analysis mentioned above, and inform what could and perhaps should be done to lessen the risk posed to the nation’s petroleum industry.
https://doi.org/10.1071/AJ05045
© CSIRO 2006