Integrity management—a model for effective implementation
Michael BolandWood Group Kenny.
The APPEA Journal 55(2) 483-483 https://doi.org/10.1071/AJ14118
Published: 2015
Abstract
The management of the integrity of hydrocarbon facilities is of fundamental importance to the duty holder to assure safety, availability of supply, and corporate reputation while minimising operational costs.
The key elements of a robust integrity management system include the application of risk techniques, deploying the right people and the right tools, continuous improvement and governance. The elements in the system need to be implemented effectively.
This extended abstract presents a model that shows how the elements are linked to produce a properly functioning system, including:
Integrity process—data handling and management, including strategies for dealing and aggregating the vast amounts of data, use of predictive technologies, monitoring in conjunction with inspection, application of the right tools and understanding of the real requirements of site activities.
Resources—priorities are properly set so resources that deliver integrity are in place.
Procedures and a documented system—an effective set of documents to underpin the strategy to manage the system.
Measuring performance—effective metrics are crucial to monitor performance and it is also important to close the loop on an annual basis.
Governance—providing effective leadership to make integrity happen.
The effective implementation of an integrity management system benefits the duty holder in assuring continuous improvement in the safety and availability of supply, and protecting corporate reputation while driving down operation costs through continuous improvement and focus.
Michael Boland has a primary degree in metallurgy (BSc) and a master’s degree in business administration (MBA). He is the team lead—plant and facilities integrity at Wood Group Kenny in Perth, Australia. Michael has 30 years’ experience in the onshore and offshore oil and gas industries covering design, construction, installation and operation. He previously worked with DNV as a principal engineer. |
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