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RESEARCH ARTICLE (Open Access)

Carbon farming co-benefits: a review of concepts, policy and potential in Australian landscapes

Sarah Milne https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4209-9435 A * , Sam Beaver B , Caitlyn Baljak C , Alex Cox A and Mark Howden B
+ Author Affiliations
- Author Affiliations

A Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Building 132, Acton, ACT 2601, Australia.

B Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions, Australian National University, Acton, ACT 2601, Australia.

C Engineers Australia, 11 National Circuit, Barton, ACT 2600, Australia.

* Correspondence to: sarah.milne@anu.edu.au

The Rangeland Journal 46, RJ24015 https://doi.org/10.1071/RJ24015
Submitted: 22 April 2024  Accepted: 29 July 2024  Published: 2 September 2024

© 2024 The Author(s) (or their employer(s)). Published by CSIRO Publishing on behalf of the Australian Rangeland Society. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND)

Abstract

Land-use changes through carbon farming in Australia have the potential to deliver significant environmental, economic, social and cultural benefits to regional areas, especially in the rangelands. For this reason, policymakers and carbon market proponents have articulated the notion of ‘co-benefits’, to refer to the desirable impacts of carbon farming beyond emissions abatement. Aboriginal leaders similarly refer to crucial ‘core benefits’ like First Nations’ custodianship of land or Country. In this article, we navigate the complex conceptual and policy terrain that now surrounds carbon farming co-benefits in Australia through a comprehensive review. This is a vital undertaking because carbon farming to date has been dominated by the federal government’s purchasing of Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) in accordance with a mandate that seeks lowest cost emissions abatement, with no formal recognition or valuation of co-benefits. This has produced an ad hoc policy environment in which some co-benefits are recognised and valued, often with significant price premiums, through a range of federal and state government, nongovernment and private schemes. To interpret this policy domain, we first argue for greater conceptual clarity through using the notion of ‘co-impacts’, which conveys how carbon farming produces an array of potential benefits, costs and risks across space and time, with differential impacts for diverse actors. Second, we review current initiatives related to carbon co-benefits in Australia, identifying over 20 separate schemes with distinct governance arrangements. Our findings point to the significant potential and value of carbon co-benefits in Australia. To achieve this potential, we argue that nationwide policy frameworks must now harmonise approaches, standardise units and measures where possible, and localise carbon farming implementation strategies.

Keywords: Australia, carbon credits, carbon farming, climate mitigation, co-benefits, co-impacts, environmental policy, risk.

Introduction

Natural and rural landscapes, where carbon is sequestered in trees, shrubs, grasses, soils and other biomass, are fundamental for safeguarding our climate system and planetary well-being. This assertion makes intuitive sense, but science-based policy mechanisms for climate mitigation through landscape management and land-use change are still catching up. This is especially the case in Australia, where activities under the Carbon Farming Initiative Act (2011) (Cth) (CFI Act) have been pursued mainly for the production of cheap carbon credits, with relatively little formal consideration of other wider impacts on people, communities, economies and ecosystem values (Baumber et al. 2019a; Carbon Market Institute 2022; Chubb et al. 2022). Now, after an independent review of the Australian Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU) scheme in 2022 and new legislation to support a domestic ‘nature repair market’ in 2023, there is an opportunity for carbon farming to be mobilised differently. New policy developments must now support more holistic approaches, by asking: How can carbon farming drive desirable and sustainable land use change? Or, how can carbon farming be deployed to achieve healthy ecosystems, thriving rural communities, strong custodianship by First Australians and carbon removal for a stable climate? In this article we explore these questions, by reviewing relevant concepts, current policy, and practical experiences in the domain of carbon farming co-benefits in Australia.

Global policy already provides key pointers on the wider societal and environmental potential of carbon sequestered in landscapes. For example, ‘nature-based solutions’ are recognised as having the capacity to provide 37% of the global climate mitigation required to meet the United Nations’ (UN) global climate targets (Díaz et al. 2019). Nature-based solutions are typically framed as externally-funded actions that ‘address societal challenges such as climate change, human health, food and water security, and disaster risk reduction effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits’ (World Bank 2022). Although caution is essential when it comes to apparently win–win policy fixes, the now all-pervasive global discourse on nature-based solutions points to new norms for climate mitigation in natural landscapes (Muradian et al. 2013; Seddon et al. 2021). Landscape interventions for climate mitigation must now aim to achieve much more than tonnes of ‘carbon dioxide equivalent’ (CO2e) sequestered or emissions avoided, by also articulating goals around human well-being, biodiversity, and sustainability. This ‘multi-benefit’ approach is now foundational in global climate policy (UNFCCC 2022).

In this policy environment, the case of Australian carbon farming looms large. Now termed the Australian Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU) Scheme, carbon farming activities in Australia have evolved significantly in the last 13 years to become a cornerstone of domestic climate policy (Carbon Market Institute 2022). The ACCU scheme overwhelmingly dominates Australia’s land sector carbon markets, representing AU$2.7 billion of dollars of public investment through the government’s Emissions Reductions Fund (ERF), which to date has been the biggest buyer of ACCUs (CER 2023). Carbon farming contracts now extend across the Australian continent, impacting the management of tens of millions of hectares of natural landscapes, mainly in rangelands (Baumber et al. 2020). In addition, the new Nature Repair Bill 2023 (Cth) raises the prospect of biodiversity certificates being traded alongside ACCUs (DCCEEW 2024d). The ACCU scheme is therefore one of the world’s biggest land sector carbon schemes, and its environmental potential is now set to be amplified over time. By comparison, the international voluntary carbon market is estimated to be worth around US$2 billion, of which credits from the REDD+ mechanism (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) comprise the greatest share (Cannon 2024). (REDD+ was developed under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention of Climate Change in 2005. It is not part of global compliance markets for carbon credits, although Article 6 of the Paris Agreement suggests that this could occur.) Australia’s land-based carbon markets are thus of global significance in terms of scale, value and potential.

In this context of market anticipation and policy change, it is vital to understand what land sector carbon interventions do to landscapes and people. Here, the notion of ‘co-benefits’ has emerged in policy discourses, as a way of promoting the potential positive impacts of carbon farming – such as securing biodiversity, supporting rural communities, and enabling First Nations’ stewardship (CSIRO 2019; Carbon Market Institute 2022; ICIN 2022). Yet other potential co-costs or risks must also be recognised and managed to ensure that carbon credits are truly ethical and sustainable (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014). This means considering how carbon farming activities can variously impact upon social equity, human well-being, climate integrity and environmental risk, among other things. Amid an array of complex and potentially overlapping policy terms, we use the word ‘co-impacts’ to refer to the range of effects generated by carbon farming, whether positive, negative, intended, or otherwise. In the next section, we explore the conceptual terrain of carbon co-impacts, making reference to international literature.

After the conceptual framing, the remainder of this article is dedicated to reviewing current policy and initiatives related to carbon farming co-impacts in Australia. Our review particularly identifies how co-benefits have been valued and rewarded through a range of mechanisms. Across these examples, we also identify how potential risks or negative co-impacts have been addressed. Our findings are presented as follows: we present essential background material on carbon and environmental markets in Australia; we describe the review methodology used to identify co-impact studies and co-benefit schemes currently operating in Australia; and we present our findings across different jurisdictions and policy domains in Australia. What emerges is an overview of how carbon co-benefits have been mobilised in policy and markets by various actors including federal and state governments, private and nongovernment bodies, and Indigenous organisations. Our conclusion then suggests how land-based carbon removal in Australia could deliver more explicit benefits for people and nature.

Key concepts for understanding the co-impacts of land sector carbon abatement

‘Co-benefits’ is a key term in climate mitigation policy in Australia (Carbon Market Institute 2022), although it is seldom defined with respect to wider and more differential co-impacts that can emerge around carbon farming activities (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014). In general, co-benefits receive policy attention because they can ease the way for often costly or unpopular climate mitigation actions – especially where particular interest groups or local constituencies are concerned. In other words, whereas climate benefits are by definition diffuse, being experienced globally by future generations as reduced risk and harm, co-benefits or co-costs tend to be accrued in shorter timeframes, at more local or regional scales (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014). Drawing from Australian cases, Fig. 1 shows how carbon farming can generate a range of different co-impacts, across environmental, social and economic domains (Fig. 1 adapted from Aboriginal Carbon Foundation 2019; Baumber et al. 2019a, 2019b; Cockfield et al. 2019; Cowie et al. 2019; Fleming et al. 2019; Metternicht et al. 2019; Climate Change Authority 2020; Point Advisory 2020). Together, these co-impacts shape the political context and consequences of carbon farming, with implications for climate action.

Fig. 1.

Illustration of the different kinds of co-impacts of carbon farming.


RJ24015_F1.gif

As noted, there is considerable variation in terminology, concepts and measurement approaches when it comes to the co-impacts of climate mitigation actions like carbon farming. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) uses the terminology of ‘co-benefits and adverse side-effects’ in its Fifth Assessment Report, to refer to the positive and negative side-effects of climate mitigation (IPCC 2014). This framing continues in subsequent reports, which also refer to ‘synergies and trade-offs’ in climate mitigation actions (IPCC 2023). In this policy domain, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide a widely accepted framework for considering human development and environmental sustainability in the context of climate mitigation. The SDGs have particularly encouraged a policy focus on potential co-benefits of land sector carbon removals like improved agricultural productivity, food security, air and water quality, and biodiversity conservation (IPCC 2023); although with relatively little nuanced description of potential costs or risks, as is typically the case in global policy (Muradian et al. 2013).

Indeed, the problem with policy framings like co-benefits is that they can simplify more complex effects. For example, the impacts of climate mitigation can be positive for some, while being negative for others. Also, when impacts are considered across scales, over time, and between different actors’ priorities, values and interests the picture becomes even more complex. For this reason, Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2014) advocate for use of the term ‘co-impacts’, to capture the various direct, indirect, intended and unintended effects of climate action. The notion of co-impacts also provides a shorthand for the vast array of other terms that are currently in use, including ‘non-climate benefits, ancillary benefits, co-impacts, co-costs, disbenefits, transaction costs, trade-offs, spillover effects, externalities and others’ (ibid: 551). Given this, we also use the term co-impacts, to provide a robust way of referring to the various potential effects of climate change mitigation actions. In Fig. 2, we provide a heuristic for interpreting carbon farming co-impacts, which shows how they can occur at local, regional and global scales, across private and public domains.

Fig. 2.

Illustration of how co-impacts occur across scales and for different beneficiaries.


RJ24015_F2.gif

Beyond these conceptual discussions, global carbon markets and their regulatory frameworks have made substantial progress towards defining, labelling, and measuring different types of carbon co-benefits and related risk management actions. In terms of land sector carbon removals and emissions avoidance, the most prominent mechanism here is that of REDD+, which aims to avoid deforestation and forest degradation, among other things. Since its emergence in 2005, the REDD+ mechanism has evolved into a vast policy domain that encompasses far more than narrow considerations of emissions reductions. With backing from international donors and multilateral agencies, REDD+ has now been cast as a way of mobilising climate finance to secure broad societal goals like biodiversity conservation (Phelps et al. 2012), community development and tenure security (Chhatre et al. 2012), social justice and equity (Schroeder and McDermott 2014), even human rights (Savaresi 2013), especially in tropical developing countries.

With these great policy expectations in play, REDD+ and its marketable co-benefits have thrived in the voluntary global carbon market. Here, carbon standards are applied to verify and validate not only emissions reductions (CO2e), but also co-benefits like biodiversity conservation and community development. Prominent examples of such multiple-benefit standards include the Gold Standard, headquartered in Switzerland, and the Verra-managed Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Alliance’s standard, headquartered in Washington, DC. (The latter covering most multi-benefit land sector carbon projects, see CCBA 2023). To achieve co-benefits that can be marketed and transacted alongside carbon credits, these international standards must be followed rigorously. This rigour involves the application of specified accounting methods, independent auditing, and public disclosure of reports through market registries. Such monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) activities have become a subfield of the global carbon industry: vital for market credibility and the generation of financial value, yet not without weaknesses in relation to ongoing complexity and contestation in the local contexts where standards are implemented (Gupta et al. 2012; Milne and Mahanty 2019).

This points to the other key domain of co-impacts policy in global carbon markets, which is the treatment of risks and negative impacts. In the context of REDD+, for example, undesirable co-impacts can be acute for local and Indigenous communities, especially where property rights and livelihoods are insecure (Milne et al. 2019). International policymakers have therefore invested heavily in the development of so-called REDD+ safeguards, which are defined as ‘minimum requirements for avoiding apparent risks’ of carbon projects (Phelps et al. 2012, 497). Standardised ‘safeguards information systems’ now operate alongside most REDD+ projects, to ensure that basic requirements are met for harm minimisation (UNFCCC 2024). A prominent safeguard in UN-backed projects is the requirement for REDD+ implementers to secure Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) from local communities and Indigenous peoples (UN-REDD Programme 2024). FPIC is also a requirement in some multi-benefit carbon standards, like the CCB standard, as it signals robust community participation and respect for the rights of Indigenous peoples (CCBA 2023). In this way, REDD+ safeguards are intertwined with the achievement of social co-benefits in the long run (Chhatre et al. 2012), including risk reduction. Importantly, this point is not lost on carbon investors, who are prepared to pay a premium for apparently safer and more transparent projects (Ernst & Young 2022).

Alongside these social policy developments, new measures for biodiversity co-benefits have also emerged. These have arisen in part because of parallel mechanisms to carbon farming like biodiversity offsets and payments for environmental services – a recent iteration now emerging through the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD 2024), which builds upon earlier global initiatives like The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB). As a result of these initiatives, measures for biodiversity credits or certificates have been developed globally, and in Australia, often using biophysical metrics that refer to species and habitat conservation. This has led to market innovation in which carbon and biodiversity units are traded together, using strategies like bundling, stapling, stacking and labelling, as shown in Fig. 3 (adapted from Compensate Foundation 2023). These strategies show how some biodiversity benefits are sold along with carbon credits, even when the two products originate from different and sometimes environmentally dissimilar places – as has occurred in some Australian examples, explored below. Only in integrated projects, where a carbon standard also measures biodiversity benefits in the same place, can there truly be coproduced carbon and biodiversity benefits.

Fig. 3.

Different approaches to selling carbon and biodiversity products.


RJ24015_F3.gif

In sum, this section of the paper has provided a conceptual overview of carbon co-impacts, and their treatment in climate policy. The international domain of voluntary REDD+ carbon projects is instructive here, given the emergence of multi-benefit standards that aim to bring various co-benefits to market, along with formal safeguards that attempt to systematise risk management. These policy mechanisms, taken together, show how a ‘multiple objectives, multiple impacts’ approach (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014) can inform thinking about the various effects of carbon farming projects across scales, for different actors. This type of approach can also help counter the problem of carbon reductionism, by positioning ecosystem health and human wellbeing outcomes as core benefits in diverse markets, not just as co-benefits attached to carbon transactions. With this in mind, we now provide a brief account of Australia’s carbon farming scheme and environmental markets, before presenting our review of current attempts to measure and transact carbon co-benefits in Australia.

Overview of carbon farming and environmental markets in Australia

Australia’s engagement with environmental markets has been pioneering, highly diverse, and of global significance in terms of scale and expenditure. Federal and state governments long ago embraced market-based approaches to addressing biodiversity threats and climate challenges, as seen in various state-led biodiversity offset policies and the ACCU Scheme. Notably, government bodies have played leading roles in designing, convening and regulating these markets, while also participating in them as a buyer and/or seller of credits. In addition to these unique domestic policy arrangements, international carbon and biodiversity standards and other ‘nature positive’ market initiatives are also gaining traction in Australia, such as the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD 2024) which promises to leverage corporate investment in nature repair.

The most significant environmental market in Australia is the federal government’s Australian Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU) Scheme, which began life as the Carbon Farming Initiative in 2011. This scheme was established to deliver least-cost greenhouse gas emissions abatement via a range of activities, including land sector emissions avoidance and carbon removal. The government, through its Emissions Reduction Fund, has been the chief buyer in this market since 2014, capturing approximately 90% of ACCU sales from a budget allocation of AU$4.5 billion (Ernst & Young 2023), claiming 217.3 million ‘tonnes of abatement’ across its investments to March 2023 (CER 2023). With recent changes in Australia’s climate policy, including tighter emissions targets for big emitters under the revised Safeguard Mechanism, private demand for ACCUs is expected to grow significantly (Deane et al. 2023). This growth will include industrial compliance buyers and new voluntary buyers chasing corporate climate commitments or ethical investments.

The vast majority of ACCUs (76%) are derived from three prominent emissions abatement methods, two of which belong to the land sector: Human Induced Regeneration (HIR) and Avoided Deforestation (AD). (The other major method is that of Landfill Gas capture, for subsequent energy generation). Notably, these are low input and/or low transaction cost methods, being prevalent on marginal agricultural land across the rangelands (see Fig. 4). This has enabled the production of cheap carbon credits, in keeping with Australia’s least-cost abatement policy (Evans 2018; Baumber et al. 2020). Other land sector carbon farming methods have not achieved such high production volumes at low cost, although they are of vital importance, especially from a co-benefits perspective. For example, ACCUs from Savanna Burning methods typically cost more to produce, yet these projects also frequently deliver a range of crucial co-benefits for Aboriginal custodians in northern Australia (Altman et al. 2020; Eggleton 2022). Projects using the Environmental Plantings methods also involve high project costs, and often high opportunity costs too, but the potential co-benefits for threatened local biodiversity in degraded areas can be of particular value, especially when plantings are mixed species in ecologically strategic locations, so that landscape connectivity is restored (Baumber et al. 2019a). Although the Australian Government and compliance buyers are still mainly focused on acquiring cheap ACCUs for mitigation purposes, the voluntary carbon market is now showing an increased interest in co-benefits, with price premiums to match (Carbon Market Institute 2022; Department of Environment and Science 2023; Clima 2024). This signals a future of more investment in higher value carbon farming in Australia.

Fig. 4.

Map of active carbon farming projects in Australia, under the ACCU Scheme (CER 2024).


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Alongside various international controversies concerning carbon markets, the integrity of Australia’s ACCU Scheme has also been questioned. Media attention and questioning of the quality of ACCUs reached a peak in 2022, which triggered the Independent Review of Australian Carbon Credit Units, also referred to as the Chubb Review. The Chubb Review concluded that the ACCU Scheme was ‘essentially sound’ and made 16 recommendations for scheme reform, all of which were accepted by the government. Importantly, the review’s 13th recommendation was that the Clean Energy Regulator (CER), which is largely responsible for the ACCU Scheme, should ‘develop procedures to support transparency of different project characteristics and types of co-benefits’ (Chubb et al. 2022, p. 11) including standards to allow the Regulator to certify co-benefits for the market context. Australia’s independent Climate Change Authority also reviewed the ACCU scheme: here too, were calls for more attention to be paid to co-impacts, along with potential disruptions from climate change risk (Climate Change Authority 2023).

The creation of policy to address these recommendations on co-benefits and risks is now underway. Although the CER does not currently play a role in measuring or incentivising co-benefits, it does have a mandate to address potential adverse co-impacts of carbon farming under current legislation. The CER’s treatment of risk is discretionary, however, and is yet to be systematised or made visible to the market through the application of public standards or risk ratings. Instead, the regulator can assess risk at a project level, and holds powers to seek additional information from projects to ensure that they are mitigating potential harms. Projects can also be rejected by the CER or the relevant Minister if they are found to have ‘material adverse impact on conservation of biodiversity, local land for farming, water availability, local communities or employment’ (Parliament of Australia 2011), although this has never happened. In addition, in April 2022, the CFI Act was amended to allow the Minister for Agriculture to veto native forest regeneration projects that might have adverse impacts on agricultural production and regional communities, a safeguard yet to be applied (Climate Change Authority 2023).

Amidst this lack of clear policies around risk regulation and management, the Carbon Market Institute (CMI), which is the peak body representing Australia’s carbon industry, has developed a voluntary Code of Conduct for those participating in carbon farming projects. Although voluntary, it has been widely accepted by most carbon service providers in Australia (Deane et al. 2023), and resembles some of the standardised efforts in international carbon markets to manage project implementation risks through safeguards, described above. That said, the impetus for CMI’s initiative is more related to professional conduct in the industry, rather than management of social and environmental risks at project sites, which have not yet been comprehensively documented (see DISER 2022; Climate Change Authority 2023). Indeed, regulated risk management to date has focused only on emissions outcomes, via the CER’s deployment of the Full Carbon Accounting Model (FullCAM) to calculate emissions reductions under the ACCU Scheme’s vegetation methods, with associated auditing protocols. In future, a much broader range of biophysical and socio-economic risks will need to be addressed systematically, especially as climate change impacts intensify in the land sector. Regulatory approaches, however, should not hinder flexible and adaptive management of carbon farming projects over time, as risks evolve.

Ultimately, as Australia’s carbon market matures, more systematic and transparent approaches to co-impacts will need to emerge, just as they have done in the context of international voluntary carbon markets. In Australian, this will likely occur through the forthcoming Australian Carbon Exchange (CER 2024), which aims to facilitate live trading of ACCUs for voluntary buyers. This platform will inevitably generate increased market interest in carbon co-benefits, along with a need for standardised ways to communicate and measure the presence of different kinds of co-impacts for potential buyers.

In this task, Australia has made significant progress in developing biodiversity units and metrics for various schemes, particularly through state governments. Perhaps the most notable example is the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme (BOS) in New South Wales, which involves major developers offsetting biodiversity loss on a like-for-like basis (BCT (Biodiversity Conservation Trust) 2022), with similar schemes now operating in Victoria and Western Australia. All have involved enormous government investment in the development of metrics for exchangeable biodiversity units, although they have faced a range of technical challenges and governance risks including questions about the viability and credibility of ‘no net loss’ concepts in the domain of biodiversity (Maron et al. 2015; Gibbons et al. 2018). As Australia moves towards recognition and measurement of carbon farming co-benefits, this knowledge is of vital relevance.

Relatedly, on environmental co-benefits, Baumber and colleagues undertook a comprehensive review of payments for ecosystem services schemes (PES) experiences in Australia (Baumber et al. 2019b), with the aim of exploring how existing measures and approaches could be adapted to the context of carbon farming. They identified a range of PES or PES-like schemes in Australia including biodiversity offsets, government conservation tenders, bundled ecosystem services programs, and water trading platforms. Although there is no overarching framework for measuring and transacting ecosystem services in Australia, they found sophisticated indicators, benchmarks and models for measuring the delivery of ecosystem services like the avoidance of soil erosion, salinity and biodiversity loss, as well as increases in habitat, ground cover, species richness and water quality. Again, these experiences offer a significant resource for developing meaningful environmental co-benefit measures in the Australian carbon farming context (Baumber et al. 2019a, 2019b), especially in the rangelands (Baumber et al. 2020).

Finally, although measures for environmental co-benefits are rather well articulated in Australia, equivalent metrics for the social, cultural and economic co-impacts of carbon farming are less well established. In part, this is because the social domain is highly subjective, with complex causalities at play. Practitioners therefore caution against overly standardised, demanding or top-down approaches to measuring socio-economic co-benefits, especially concerning First Nations’ communities (Barber and Jackson 2017; Aboriginal Carbon Foundation 2019). In government schemes that do attempt to measure socio-economic co-benefits, like Queensland’s Landscape Restoration Fund (see below), the Indigenous-led Core Benefits Framework has been adopted (Aboriginal Carbon Foundation 2019) alongside other more generic socio-economic metrics that gauge, for example, new regional employment or training outcomes and/or opportunities for local businesses and community members in carbon farming projects (LRF 2023). Scholars too are steadily building more nuanced studies of carbon farming’s socio-economic benefits and risks across scales in the rangelands, to inform future governance (e.g. Cowie et al. 2019; Fleming et al. 2019; DISER 2022). Building upon this, we now present our review methodology and findings.

Review methodology

Given high rates of change in the Australian policy environment, our review focuses upon initiatives or schemes that are currently active or are under development, with most observations emerging from 2019. This captures a period during which Australia’s ACCU scheme and other activities have matured and grown, along with policy reorientation towards carbon co-benefits, as described above. To explore current efforts that measure, value and transact carbon co-benefits in Australia, we reviewed only projects or schemes that met the following criteria: (i) they produce a tradeable CO2e unit with a co-benefit of some kind; and (ii) part or all of the product involves Australian land-use change, which to date has mainly occurred in the rangelands. This undertaking has involved searches for current and proposed policy and initiatives, as well as a review of scholarly and grey literature. The results section describes the review findings.

Our review method was qualitative and ‘integrative’ (Snyder 2019), in that we sought to explore the emerging field of carbon farming co-impacts in Australia from a range of perspectives, with the aim of drawing out novel insights from this relatively under-researched area. Using key search terms in Google Scholar and Google, we identified policy and project websites, reports and other forms of grey literature, as well as academic literature on carbon co-impacts, co-benefits and co-risks, and market treatment of these things. This led to the production of a database of articles and resources, which listed key features including: the primary topic of each article or source; the treatment of co-benefits or co-impacts; the type of article or source; and key insights for our inquiry into the co-benefits of Australian carbon farming. Alongside peer-reviewed articles, grey literature sources included carbon market databases, government policy documents, press releases, parliamentary submissions, consultancy reports, carbon market standards, project and policy webpages, and newspaper articles. Thirty types of co-impacts were identified, across over 100 sources.

After this initial review, we took a policy-oriented approach to analysis by looking at existing schemes to finance, reward or transact carbon co-benefits in Australia. To do this systematically, we developed a framework for documenting the key design and implementation features of each mechanism or scheme. This was a necessary analytical step because there are no widely established or standardised frameworks for assessing multi-benefit schemes in Australia (Baumber et al. 2019a; Chubb et al. 2022). Our framework was developed iteratively, and in response to key concerns in the policy literature, outlined above. Ultimately our framework enabled us to assess how co-benefits were being articulated, governed, monitored, verified and implemented in Australia (see Table 1).

Table 1.Analytical framework for reviewing carbon co-benefits policies and schemes in Australia.

Key dimensionsIndicative questions and evidence
1. Articulation of co-benefitsWhich co-benefits are measured, targeted and incentivised?
e.g. biodiversity, soil health, First Nations participation
What is the co-benefit product and how does it relate to carbon credits?
2. Governance of the schemeWho administers, funds, buys, sells, and/or verifies the co-benefit product?
e.g. government, nongovernment organisations, private actors
What are their motivations?
e.g. carbon mitigation, biodiversity, or First Nations stewardship
How is the scheme designed and implemented?
e.g. stakeholder consultation, evidence of Free Prior and Informed Consent
3. Standards, monitoring and integrityWhat standards are used to measure, report, and verify the co-benefits?
e.g. domestic or international standards, or self-developed metrics
What metrics and indicators are used to measure co-benefits?
e.g. tree canopy cover, vegetation height, species presence/absence
What integrity measures are used to verify credits and co-benefits?
e.g. independent verification, third-party monitoring, auditing
4. Implementation stageAt what stage of development or implementation is the scheme?
e.g. planning phase, scoping for projects, projects funded, years operational

Co-benefits in Australian policy and practice

This section presents our review findings, by summarising current approaches to measure, transact and value co-benefits in the Australian context. As described above, our review sought to identify and examine any initiative or scheme currently operational or in development, which produces a tradeable CO2e unit with co-benefits, where part or all of the product involves changes to Australian land use. These schemes are not just limited to transactions of ACCUs plus co-benefits, but also include examples from international voluntary carbon markets being implemented in Australia. To present our findings, we group the different schemes into their jurisdictional or policy domains, as follows: federal government efforts, state government schemes, private schemes and those led by nongovernment organisations (NGOs), and First Nations led initiatives.

Federal government initiatives

The federal government’s leadership and funding of the ACCU Scheme has set a vital foundation for land sector carbon markets in Australia, representing the overwhelming majority of land-use agreements for climate mitigation. Despite the magnitude of this investment, policy on co-impacts is incipient, and is mainly restricted to considerations of biodiversity co-benefits. As shown in Table 2, there are two prominent pilot schemes that have attempted to combine carbon and biodiversity benefits, being the Carbon + Biodiversity (C + B) and Enhanced Remnant Vegetation (ERV) Pilots, both under the Agriculture Biodiversity Stewardship Package launched in 2021 (DCCEEW 2024a), now housed in the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW). These pilots are intended to build knowledge and practical tools for future market developments, such as the recently legislated Nature Repair Bill, which aims to develop markets for biodiversity certificates that could in future be coupled with the ACCU scheme (Jacob et al. 2023; DCCEEW 2024b). Notably, the Nature Repair Bill does not intend to facilitate biodiversity offsets, but instead intends to ‘mobilise private finance to repair and protect our unique natural environments’ (DCCEEW 2024d). These developments illustrate how the consideration of carbon co-benefits in federal policy has been largely limited to biodiversity.

Table 2.Federal government schemes that involve carbon co-benefits.

Initiative nameProduct typeFundingAdministratorDate initiated
Carbon + Biodiversity Pilots ALabelled ACCU$18.8 million allocatedDCCEEWDecember 2021
Enhanced Remnant Vegetation Pilots BLabelled ACCUUp to $36 million from 2021 to 2031DCCEEWSeptember 2021
Nature Repair Market CTradeable biodiversity certificates will be issued to projects. Potential for stacking with ACCU Scheme projects.$7.7 million for developmentClean Energy RegulatorLegislated in December 2023
Future funding unknown

Given that the three co-benefit-focused federal schemes are in their infancy, there is limited published material on the ways that biodiversity certificates or credits will be assessed, verified and monitored over time. There is also varied articulation of how biodiversity outcomes will be bundled or joined with ACCUs produced at the same project site. However, the C + B pilot scheme is instructive, as the current suite of projects suggests that clear planning for biodiversity improvements can be implemented at the outset of a carbon farming project. The C + B pilots are testing this approach using the Reforestation by Environmental or Mallee Plantings ACCU method (hereafter Environmental Plantings) across 12 different Natural Resource Management (NRM) regions in all six states (DCCEEW 2024b). The pilots aim to show how biodiversity services can be transacted through well-implemented mixed environmental plantings, in consultation with landholders. It is not yet clear how biodiversity services or outcomes will be transacted through the C + B pilots in the long run.

Indeed, a core challenge for all federal schemes relates to the measurement of biodiversity services or outcomes. Reliable and standardised metrics should underpin the creation of biodiversity units, and in turn this should lead to transparent and equitable ways of rewarding those who provide biodiversity services. Yet Australia’s wide range of bioregions and distinctive local contexts and jurisdictions make standardisation at the federal level difficult (Evans 2018; Metternicht et al. 2019; Baumber et al. 2019b; Lindenmayer et al. 2023). At this early stage, it appears that the ERV Pilots are providing payments for the delivery of agreed management activities that should improve biodiversity over time, without linking payments to biodiversity outcomes per se (DAWE 2021a, 2021b; DCCEEW 2024c). This activity-based approach offers a cheap and easy way to account for biodiversity services in the short term, although meaningful measures of actual biodiversity or outcome-based approaches will be required in the long term, to ensure effectiveness (Baumber et al. 2019a).

The Nature Repair Market is also tackling this challenge. At present, the government proposes to develop an overarching ‘Biodiversity Assessment Instrument’ and other frameworks for standardisation, with details not yet available (DCCEEW 2024d). Debate is also simmering over other looming implementation issues, such as potential overlaps between the Nature Repair Market and existing state and private schemes for biodiversity certificates or offsets (DPE 2023; NRM Regions Australia 2023); processes of method development and standards for independent monitoring and verification (Lindenmayer et al. 2023); and processes for proper representation and participation of First Australians (ICIN 2023). These nontrivial matters will ultimately determine the effectiveness and social acceptability of the future Nature Repair Market.

This points to the bigger picture, which is that co-impacts, beyond biodiversity co-benefits, have not yet been addressed systematically or explicitly in federal policy. This was noted in the Chubb Review, which recommended that carbon co-benefits be more systematically documented and articulated (Chubb et al. 2022); with the government accepting this recommendation. Meanwhile, co-benefits accruing to individual landholders participating in federal pilots are increasingly being articulated. For example, DCCEEW cites benefits to farmers of the C + B pilots, listed on their website as ‘shelter for stock, protection of waterways and dams, and reduction of soil erosion’ (2024b). These types of co-benefits were also identified in an early appraisal of farmer experiences of the C + B pilots (Jacob et al. 2023), and other recent studies on the relationship between resilience and carbon farming (e.g. Baumber et al. 2020; Webster 2023). These studies point to the immediate potential of ACCU co-benefits at the farm or landholder level, while also warning against an overly narrow focus on individual economic interests.

A fully-fledged consideration of co-benefits in policy would therefore encompass wider efforts to identify potential risks or negative outcomes resulting from carbon farming. For example, with recent reforms to the Safeguard Mechanism – whereby heavy emitters are subject to a cap and trade system that will incentivise the purchasing of carbon offsets – some analysts foresee strong increases in demand for ACCUs and hence the possibility of rapid and potentially undesirable land-use changes (Deane et al. 2023). Risks could entail reduced agricultural production, financial risks to farmers, and other social and economic impacts on rural communities where carbon farming is concentrated (Baumber et al. 2020; DISER 2022; Jassim et al. 2022). In international carbon markets, as discussed above, such risks have been addressed through co-benefits certification and ‘REDD+ safeguards’ systems, which together enable carbon credits to acquire greater legitimacy and hence market value (Milne and Mahanty 2019). Although these systems are no panacea, risk management standards do enhance accountability and risk avoidance over time, and should form part of any federal policy on carbon farming co-benefits.

State-based approaches to co-benefits

Leveraging off the federal government’s ACCU scheme, state governments have taken initiative in articulating and rewarding carbon farming co-benefits in Australia. Our review identified five schemes, at various stages of implementation, in Western Australia (WA), New South Wales (NSW), Victoria and Queensland (see Table 3). Like in federal policy, these schemes tend to focus on biodiversity and other environmental co-benefits, though Queensland’s Land Restoration Fund (LRF) and WA’s Carbon Farming and Land Restoration Program (CFLRP) also target socio-economic co-benefits, and co-benefits for First Australians (DPIRD 2023; LRF 2023). By far the largest scheme is Queensland’s LRF, which has a AU$500 million budget allocation, having already committed AU$82 million to its ‘ACCUs plus co-benefits’ projects since 2019. Its explicit aim is to target projects that provide ‘additional benefits beyond carbon income’, which they measure using their own Co-benefits Standard (LRF 2023). The only other state to adopt a formal standard for co-benefits is WA, emulating the Queensland model.

Table 3.State government schemes for carbon co-benefits.

InitiativeProduct typeFunding allocationAdministratorStart date
Western Australia: Carbon Farming and Land Restoration Program (CFLRP) ALabelled ACCU – ‘ACCU Plus’$15 million budgetDepartment of Primary Industries and Regional DevelopmentJanuary 2022
$3.8 million allocated
Queensland: Land Restoration Fund BLabelled ACCU – ‘ACCU Plus’$500 million allocatedDepartment of Environment, Science and InnovationLate 2019
Verified with LRF Co-benefits Standard; Aboriginal Carbon Foundation Standard used for First Australians co-benefits or core benefits$82 million dispensed
NSW: High Impact Partnerships CFor ACCU projects that demonstrate co-benefits, and/or innovate delivery for co-benefits and at scale$10 million budgetNSW Office of Energy and Climate ChangeFebruary 2023
$6.8 million dispensed
NSW: BCT Pilot: ‘Biodiversity and Carbon Conservation Tender for restoring threatened Murray woodlands’ DEnvironmental Plantings ACCU project + payments for conservation management through BCTUnknownNSW Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT)January 2023
Labelled ‘premium’ ACCUExpressions of Interest sought in 2023
Victoria: Bush Bank Program EEnvironmental Plantings that restore native habitats and specific species.$77 million allocatedDepartment of Energy, Environment and Climate Action (DEECA)April 2022
Supplementary income may come from ACCUs$30.9 million of this budget is for private land
Victoria: Victorian Carbon Farming Program (VCFP) FMulti-benefit Environmental Plantings.$15.3 million grants to private landholdersAgriculture Victoria and DEECAMarch 2024
Funding a function of carbon stock predictions.

Given the lack of national standards for co-benefits, our findings show how states have adopted innovative approaches to monitoring and verification. For example, WA and Queensland have drawn upon external third-party standards to verify some elements of their co-benefit investments, by using: (i) the Aboriginal Carbon Foundation’s standard (2019) on measures of well-being and leadership amongst First Australians, known as the Core Benefits Framework, and (ii) the Accounting for Nature® framework (2024) that certifies the health of environmental assets. These external frameworks bring rigour and standardisation to some projects, but they are not strict requirements in the two ‘ACCU Plus’ programs. Rather, the two schemes provide examples of metrics and reporting protocols for project developers to adapt and deploy on a case-by-case basis. This use of ‘participant-proposed’ methods for monitoring, reporting and verification can be a powerful way of ensuring that projects are grounded in their local context, being able to reflect local views and expertise (Bremer et al. 2023). However, local ownership of monitoring and reporting can be at odds with market imperatives, which tend to reward standardised measures and third-party or expert verification of ‘environmental services’ across investments (Robertson 2006). For state governments looking to encourage carbon-plus-benefits projects, with local buy-in and ownership, this is a trade-off that needs to be navigated.

Despite the adoption of standards in Queensland and WA, there is a notable diversity in approaches to co-benefits in Victoria and NSW. As indicated in Table 3, these states have adopted more grant-based approaches, where state governments are primarily focused on coupling carbon with other environmental and biodiversity benefits. Notably, these states have exhibited a strong preference for Environmental Plantings methods in their investments, although registration with the ACCU Scheme is not always a strict requirement. This may be due to local conditions: environmental degradation and land use pressure are high in NSW and Victoria, and the ACCU price alone is insufficient to incentivise extensive uptake of environmental plantings (Evans 2018; Chubb et al. 2022). Thus, for governments aiming to generate biodiversity benefits, as well as carbon removal per hectare, a focus on Environmental Plantings ACCU projects makes sense – especially in threatened bioregions like the Murray Woodlands (see Table 3). Financing for landscape restoration can therefore play a key role in making environmental plantings viable and attractive in these higher rainfall areas, where the opportunity and input costs of restoration are high, especially on private farmland. Some of these state programs (e.g. VCFP in Table 3) also recognise that restoration can improve farm productivity and aesthetic values too.

Overall, we find that state government schemes are operating more as a subsidy for ACCU projects that they wish to encourage, either for their biodiversity benefits or for other benefits such as the well-being of regional communities and stewardship by First Australians. The advantage of this form of state engagement is that payments for co-benefits do not have to be beholden to external market whims or standards, enabling governments to guide land-use interventions informed by local expertise, knowledge and relationships – especially that which is already held in state government departments and Natural Resource Management (NRM) regions. That said, the potential disadvantage of this state-based approach to co-benefit financing is that there is a lack of national oversight, standardisation and regulation. In the long run, this could hamper the emergence or perceived integrity of ACCU Plus units or other co-benefits units that emerge from state-backed schemes. The new Nature Repair Market may yet address some of these dilemmas.

Nongovernment and private initiatives

Alongside government initiatives in Australia, a plethora of new multi-benefit schemes and credits has emerged under the auspices of private and nongovernment organisations, both domestic and international. A key finding of our review is the sheer diversity of products and credits now emerging from these private schemes (see Table 4). In contrast to government programs, which invest in multiple benefits from a single project site, some private initiatives in Australia are finding innovative ways to staple or bundle co-benefit initiatives with a range of carbon products (see Fig. 3 above). This means that niche biodiversity credits, targeting endangered species or habitats, can be stapled with carbon credits from different places, even from overseas. Buyers in this growing nature market must exercise their own due diligence, to ensure that they know what they are buying.

Table 4.Nongovernment and private multi-benefit schemes.A

Credit schemeDeveloperProduct typeValueStart date
Kelp Credits BCanopy BlueStandalone credit or stapled credit. Working on stackingUnknown2023
Cassowary Credits CTerrain NRMStandalone credit or a stacked credit$1 million government pilotsSept. 2022
Unknown since
Reef Credits DGreenCollar, EcoMarkets AustraliaStand alone credit, possibly can be stackedPossibly $2.7 millionOct. 2017
NaturePlus Credit EGreenCollarStandalone credit produced, can be stacked or stapledUnknown2022
Biodiverse Reforestation Carbon Offsets FCarbon NeutralBundled/labelled product, though not formally registeredUnknown2008
Cultural Fire Credits GAbCF & Firesticks AllianceStandalone credit that can be stacked or stapled with ACCUs or international carbon creditsUnknownJune 2022
Community Credits & Farmer Credits HAboriginal Carbon FoundationLabelled premium ACCU or bundled – unsureUnknownNot yet
EcoAustralia Credits/Australian Biodiversity Unit ISouth PoleStapledUnknownUnknown
A Not including international schemes, of which two are operating in Australia (Gold Standard, CCB Standard).
B Canopy Blue (2023), Reklev (2023). NB although Kelp credits entail marine activities, they are still valid here.

As shown in Table 4, the developers and innovators in Australian environmental markets are either private or profit-for-purpose companies or nongovernment organisations (NGOs). Many have gained experience by participating as aggregators or project developers in Australia’s ACCU scheme, for example GreenCollar, South Pole, and the Aboriginal Carbon Foundation (AbCF). From within these ranks, significant innovation and progress has been made towards the creation of market standards for the measurement of healthy ecosystems and core benefits for First Australians. Here, the Accounting for Nature® framework (2024) and the Aboriginal Carbon Foundation’s Core Benefits Verification Framework (2019) are stand-out examples, which have influenced state government approaches to co-benefit financing, as noted above.

Apart from the emergence of these new frameworks and standards, harmonisation across the market as a whole has been limited. Indeed, the distinguishing feature of this largely informal, voluntary and fractured market is the way that noncarbon benefits are being stapled with carbon credits from a separate geographic location. For example, several initiatives offer a self-certified unit or certificate from an environmental restoration or conservation project in Australia, which is then stapled with an international carbon credit for buyers to use towards their voluntary emissions targets. This has effectively unlocked private sector funds for domestic environmental and First Australians-led projects, where businesses want to do more than just purchase carbon credits. In Australia, this stapling approach is supported in voluntary markets, where buyers are seeking Climate Active or carbon neutral certification (Climate Active 2024). This market trend also corresponds with wider observations that voluntary buyers are motivated to invest in local co-benefits like biodiversity conservation and First Australians or community well-being, not just emissions reductions and removals (Carbon Market Institute 2023; Climate Change Authority 2023).

As the voluntary market evolves in Australia, it is worth noting that international carbon schemes have made significant progress with incorporating co-benefits and safeguard measures into their projects and products. Schemes such the Gold Standard (2023), Plan Vivo (2024), and the Verra-administrated Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA 2023) all demonstrate ways to measure and verify co-benefits that occur alongside voluntary carbon projects, such as through the REDD+ method. Although there has been critique of these schemes, explored above, they do at least show how co-benefits certification can attract value and investment in voluntary carbon markets.

First Nations’ leadership in carbon farming

In the Australian context, there are strong potential synergies between land sector carbon markets and First Nations’ custodianship of landscapes. Evidence is clear in relation to the diverse and invaluable co-benefits for First Australians of carbon farming and related activities, including economic, social, cultural and health benefits (Robinson et al. 2014, 2016a, 2016b; Country Needs People 2017; Altman et al. 2020; Pert et al. 2020; Edwards et al. 2021; Sangha et al. 2021). In this final section of the review, we explore how the interests of First Australians are intersecting with the ACCU scheme and other environmental markets, demonstrating notable autonomy and agency.

Leadership and innovation by First Australians in carbon farming has been remarkable in Australia, especially in the tropical savanna areas, spanning the Kimberley region, the Top End of the Northern Territory (NT), and Far North Queensland. In these areas, Aboriginal presence on Country is pronounced, with some land rights having been formalised through the 1976 Land Rights Act in the NT, and others finally recognised under the 1993 Native Title Act (Cth). This has led to extensive (re)articulation of First Nations land rights across the tropical north and in arid ecosystems. For example, 97% of the Kimberley region now has native title determination (KLC 2024), and half of the NT is held under inalienable freehold title by Aboriginal people (NLC 2024). This has provided a basis for Aboriginal people to lead on actions that involve ‘Caring for Country’, a mode of work and cultural obligation that is much more than natural resource management (Weir et al. 2011; Altman and Kerins 2012).

This history and geography places Aboriginal people and Traditional Owners in a prominent role in relation to carbon farming in Northern Australia. Here, the main carbon farming method is Savanna Fire Management, which produces ACCUs through the avoidance of hot and destructive late dry season wildfires (see Map 1). As the Indigenous Carbon Industry Network (ICIN) notes, 95% of the land where First Australians can legally engage in carbon farming falls within tropical savanna or arid zones, where fire management is one of the only applicable methods (Grace and Holmes 2022). In arid zones there are fewer options, although a ‘Northern Arid Zone’ (NAZ) Extension to the savanna burning method has been proposed, with compelling likely benefits for climate mitigation, biodiversity and Aboriginal co-benefits in arid spinifex grasslands (Yates et al. 2023). Significantly, the main land management approach in the savanna burning method is to implement smaller and cooler ‘mosaic’ fires across extensive areas, in the early dry season – an approach that corresponds with cultural burning or traditional Aboriginal fire management (Altman et al. 2020; ICIN 2022). As a result, there is strong potential for carbon farming to subsidise and support custodianship of Country by First Australians.

Here, Aboriginal leadership continues to assert that First Nations custodianship of Country should be seen as the core benefit of any carbon farming activity, not just a co-benefit. This philosophy is articulated in the Core Benefits Framework developed by the Aboriginal Carbon Foundation (2019), which places the role and well-being of First Australians custodians at the front and centre of any carbon-motivated intervention. Indeed, as Altman and colleagues (2020) explain in their account of the Arnhem Land Fire Abatement (ALFA) initiative, the idea of Aboriginal custodianship being mobilised for emissions abatement came well before the Carbon Farming Act of 2011. It was in Arnhem Land that the Savanna Fire Management method originated in 2006, when a unique collaboration between fire ecologists, Traditional Owners and Aboriginal ranger groups produced one of the world’s first land-use agreements for emissions abatement, with support from the resources company ConocoPhillips. In this sense, Aboriginal-led savanna burning offers a paradigmatic case for carbon markets, where there is ‘symbiotic relationship’ between emissions reductions, the livelihoods and income of First Australians, and the wider Caring for Country movement (Altman et al. 2020).

First Nations leadership in carbon markets therefore has the potential to shift investors and regulators into a realm that is beyond carbon. In this realm, it becomes possible to see socio-economic, cultural, human health and other environmental impacts as the primary benefits of any carbon abatement project (Aboriginal Carbon Foundation 2019). Here, carbon farming investors and government funding bodies often assume the presence of co-benefits for First Australians, without rigorous definition or measurement of these benefits (Barber and Jackson 2017). In some ways this is acceptable, given that some co-benefits standards or indicators could introduce significant bureaucratic or measurement burdens, imposed upon communities by external actors (ibid). One solution to this problem is the Aboriginal Carbon Foundation’s Indigenous-verified ACCUs, along with other innovations like Cultural Fire Credits (see Table 4). These premium credits place an emphasis on First Australians having control over metrics and measurement of well-being and custodianship (Catalyst Markets 2024). They are also responding to strong market demand for First Nations co-benefits, or core benefits.

Yet there are still opportunities to grasp in relation to monitoring and verification. For example, the lack of rigorous and transparent co-benefits standards nationally means that the so-called Indigenous price premium on ACCUs can sometimes be garnered by non-Indigenous project proponents using the Savanna Burning method. (This problem was cited anecdotally by three carbon practitioners to Milne in 2022, in the Northern Territory). As the Aboriginal Carbon Foundation (2019) notes, although savanna burning is associated heavily with Aboriginal involvement, only about 30% of active projects are owned by or significantly involve First Australians. This points to a risk of oversimplification in the market, whereby co-benefits for Aboriginal people are sometimes correlated simply with savanna burning, without need for projects to disclose ownership, governance and benefit-sharing arrangements. Greater transparency could therefore secure more benefits for Traditional Owners (for example, see Clima 2024).

Other technical and geographical challenges also remain to be solved. For example, Western Australia’s CFLRP (see Table 3) has excluded the Savanna Fire Management method from its remit, which means that Aboriginal communities in the Kimberley region cannot access additional funding to support their carbon farming projects, which are costly to run and generally require cofinancing alongside ACCU dividends (Altman et al. 2020). In addition, the Indigenous Carbon Industry Network notes that First Australians have not yet benefited much from carbon projects beyond the tropical savannas (Grace and Holmes 2022). They recommend that, for co-benefits to be generated more widely for First Australians, new ACCU methods could be extended to increase overlay with the estate of these peoples, such as the proposed NAZ extension (Yates et al. 2023). Additional efforts to strengthen the rights and potential benefits for Native Title holders in other ecosystems where carbon farming is active are also vitally important, such as across the rangelands where Human Induced Regeneration ACCU projects have been implemented and where the proposed Integrated Farm and Land Management method should apply (see Map 1). Leading examples are emerging in these geographies, such as the Kullili people’s (re)acquisition of Country in southwest Queensland through a large land purchase that leveraged carbon finance (Casben 2023). These developments speak to untapped potential.

Conclusion

This article has reviewed current knowledge and policy in relation to carbon farming co-impacts in Australia. To begin the article, we drew from international literature to develop a conceptual framing around ‘multi-benefit’ approaches to climate mitigation, which are increasingly the norm in global policy (UNFCCC 2022; World Bank 2022). Here, the international voluntary carbon market has shown leadership, especially in relation to REDD+ projects that use co-benefit verification and risk management systems (Chhatre et al. 2012; CCBA 2023). These standards do not guarantee perfection or transparency (Milne and Mahanty 2019), but they do at least provide frameworks for accountability, forming a basis for transactions between buyers and sellers, and an articulation of aspirations around quality, sustainability, biodiversity, Indigenous custodianship, and human well-being – not just tonnes of CO2e.

Given the sheer scale and level of investment involved in Australia’s carbon farming scheme – making it one of the world’s biggest land sector climate mitigation schemes – it is surprising that domestic policy and regulation have not kept pace with the complexity of ‘co-impacts’ involved (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014). Our review points to an emerging evidence base on co-impacts in Australia, which shows how the costs and benefits of carbon farming accrue differently among actors, over space and time. To seize opportunities and to mitigate risks that emerge from carbon farming, these co-impacts require consistent and proactive policy settings, which have not yet been achieved.

Indeed, our review of active policy mechanisms for carbon farming co-benefits points to an ad hoc policy environment, in which many flowers are blooming. For example, we identified over 20 different schemes active in Australia for securing and/or transacting carbon farming co-benefits. These schemes involved two federal pilots and six state administered government grant programs, aimed mainly at augmenting the ACCU Scheme to achieve new innovations or co-benefits. Here, states have exhibited a preference for directing their matching funds to habitat restoration and other high value projects in which ACCU revenues alone are insufficient to drive desirable change. Queensland’s Landscape Restoration Fund (LRF 2023) is exemplary here, especially given its adoption of co-benefits standards that draw from established third-party verification frameworks, including the Indigenous-led Core Benefits Verification Framework (Aboriginal Carbon Foundation 2019). Other examples can be found in the private and nongovernment sectors too, where we found 10 different schemes in operation. Together, these innovations signal the potential of multi-benefit environmental markets in Australia, especially if approaches can be harmonised across jurisdictions, for more systematic investments that are in line with national priorities.

Such a task is not straightforward, however, as debate over appropriate co-benefits metrics and values continues. This is especially true for environmental co-benefits like biodiversity and habitat improvements, but it is also true for social, cultural and community benefits (Barber and Jackson 2017; Metternicht et al. 2019; Baumber et al. 2019a). Herein there are core measurement dilemmas to navigate, such trade-offs between rigour and cost-effectiveness; third-party oversight versus community ownership; and the use of standardised metrics versus those which are sensitive to the local context. In the current policy environment, project proponents may be collecting their own data on co-benefits, but there remains a lack of disclosure and independent verification of co-benefit claims. Thus, if measurement and reporting of carbon co-benefits could be somewhat standardised nationally – such as via a nested or adaptive governance approach that allows for local control and responsiveness (Nelson et al. 2008) – then market confidence and investment in ‘good carbon’ should rise.

Finally, we warn against being evangelical about standardisation and commodification in environmental markets. This is because local realities will ultimately shape outcomes and co-impacts. Drawing from local expertise and knowledge is therefore vital to interpret and avoid potential risks, as well as to maximise opportunities and co-benefits. For example, deep local knowledge is now being deployed to ensure that savanna burning methods avoid perversity and enhance ecosystem values through careful biodiversity accounting (Evans and Russell-Smith 2019; Corey et al. 2020; Sangha et al. 2021). Innovative relationships with local, regional and First Australians communities will also be fundamental over time, to ensure that social risks are minimised, and co-benefits are maximised equitably (Altman et al. 2020; Baumber et al. 2020; DISER 2022). Thus, for carbon farming to play a role in achieving landscapes that are biodiverse and healthy, while supporting thriving rural and Indigenous communities, national policy frameworks and regulation must find ways to land gently on the ground, to enable localised practices and implementation. If national policy can navigate this delicate terrain, then Australian carbon farming has the potential to deliver vital benefits for people and nature, to become a world leader in land sector carbon abatement.

Data availability

The data that support this study will be shared upon reasonable request to the corresponding author.

Conflicts of interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest with reference to the material presented.

Declaration of funding

The authors acknowledge funding from the Institute of Climate, Energy and Disaster Solutions at the Australian National University.

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