Flawed recommendations on surface hygiene within the existing Interim Influenza Pandemic National Infection Control Guidelines
Greg Whiteley A C and Trevor Glasbey B
+ Author Affiliations
- Author Affiliations
A Whiteley Corporation, Suite 501, Level 5, 12 Mount Street, North Sydney, NSW 2060, Australia.
B Whiteley Corporation, 19-23 Laverick Avenue, Tomago, NSW 2322, Australia.
C Corresponding author. Email: gsw@whiteley.com.au
Healthcare Infection 14(4) 177-179 https://doi.org/10.1071/HI09016
Published: 21 December 2009
Abstract
The Interim Infection Control Guidelines for Pandemic Influenza in Healthcare and Community Settings, published by the Australian Commonwealth Government in 2006, have been reviewed and found to contain recommendations that, if they were made by a private organisation, would be potentially illegal under the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989, and also raise some concern in relation to occupational health and safety. The guidelines also fail to recommend the use of disinfecting products with specific claims relating to influenza virus that have been approved by the Therapeutic Goods Agency.
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